Between Raisi and Rafah
20 Iyar 5784 (May 28, 2024)
Alhamdulillah, Eli Kopter’s mission was successful. The helicopter was turned into a helikotlet, and in response to five days of mourning declared by their aging Supreme leader, there were fireworks celebrating the timely demise of the Butcher of Tehran. Not to be outdone, LEZM GANG declared five days of memetic shitposting. Glorious times.
The twenty-four hours of the news cycle dominated by news of the crash and ‘rescue’ mission was illuminating. Why the Iranian President’s entourage elected to continue flying in near-zero visibility in one of the most mountainous and remote parts of Persia is and likely will remain a mystery. Ultimately, Raisi and Amirabdollahian were mere figureheads, cogs in a totalitarian state that will be replaced. It confirms that while sanctions are an effective tactical tool, they by themselves cannot achieve strategic victories, and must be paired with other diplomatic and military tools to successfully isolate, weaken, and eventually replace the theocratic dictatorship in Iran. Just before Raisi got stoned to death by a mountain, the Biden administration leaked the beginning of ‘indirect’ talks with Iran via Oman.
Amid the gaffe-riddled collapse of its state media apparatus, the Iranian regime requested night-vision equipped helicopters from Erdogan. Iran and Turkey are at odds over the future of Syria, and are vying for regional dominance, so I am sure Erdogan relished the opportunity to humiliate his rival with “brotherly assistance”, and welcomed the distraction from his ongoing campaign to bring the Turkish economy to utter ruin.
Iran also asked for the activation of COPERNICUS, the European Union’s emergency satellite mapping system. That the European Union acquiesced to this request was a clear demonstration of moral cowardice and Western naivete. It affirms for me that the Europeans have no constructive role to play in stabilizing the Middle East, and that Israel should remain deeply skeptical of any diplomatic effort being led by a European power. With weeks to go before the European Parliamentary elections, this I think will prove to be a disastrous own-goal for the centrists, social democrats, and leftist parties in Europe bracing for an overwhelming victory for ‘populist’ and ‘far right’ parties. The governments of Ireland, Malta, Norway, Spain and Slovenia, in coordination with foreign policy chief Joseph Borrell, seek to unilaterally impose a two-state solution by diplomatic fiat and push for a European foreign policy ‘realignment’ in the Middle East. The French sponsored conceptzia of “strategic autonomy” will clash with the concrete security interests of the Baltic states and Poland, and with the idea of “historical responsibility” still deeply resonant in the national political ethos of Austria, Czechia, and Germany. It will also face opposition from other EU states like Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia who are gravitating towards Russia. The divergent reactions to news of arrest warrants being sought for Gallant and Netanyahu is a microcosm of a realignment in progress.
The realignment will not succeed, but it has and will continue to destabilize and polarize the European Union precisely when American security guarantees, Israeli intelligence and military technology, and political unity are crucial to their future security. It is clear that Israel cannot and should not view with any credibility any EU diplomatic initiative in the Middle East, and it should be clear that the political and security relationship with the United States will become more not less important to Israel over time.
Caving to the Arab street will be electorally disastrous for Eurocrats, and will have the knock on effect of strengthening Netanyahu. The attempted realignment has pigeonholed the various players in Israeli politics seeking to oust Bibi. While Gantz, Gallant, and Lapid have been afforded the political cover to criticize Netanyahu for the absence of a “day after plan” for Gaza, to remain silent on unilateral recognition of a Palestinian state, and the ICC arrest warrants would be political suicide.
European decline, combined with the stunning lack of Iranian technological capabilities, underscores the significance of Israel’s qualitative and military technological advantage (QMTA): a key pillar of the US-Israel relationship. There are clearly political disagreements between the Biden and Netanyahu governments on the overall strategic direction of the Middle East. The Biden administration emphatically wants a normalization agreement between Israel and Saudi Arabia because it would land him a foreign policy win, mullify attacks from Trump and shore up his support with Jewish Americans. No Israeli politician is willing to sign on to such an agreement if it requires putting the Palestinian question back at the heart of regional diplomacy, given the mood of the Israeli electorate after October 7. It remains an open question whether these disagreements can be resolved.
There are positive indicators that efforts to resolve these gaps are yielding progress.
Jake Sullivan’s latest visits to MBS saw a softening in the Saudi position from requiring an “irreversible” to a mere “ credible pathway” to a Palestinian state. After seizing the Rafah crossing, the Netanyahu government offered the Palestinian Authority the opportunity to assume security control, but to do so quietly, a move which Abbas refused, indicating that any “reformed” Palestinian Authority is impossible until a successor to him is found. Blinken acknowledged that Israel still may not take the deal, but as the adage goes: the first step in solving a problem is admitting there is one.
The Americans have expressed their belief that “the only way to defeat Hamas and ensure Israel’s long-term security is to connect the military effort to a holistic integrated strategy.” The Biden Administration, which has blown hot air into the media for months about a ‘major’ military operation in Rafah being a red line, have suddenly withdrawn their objections, indicating “initial satisfaction” with how Israel has “tailored” the operation. According to the Americans, Israeli security control of the Rafah crossing, the destruction of the smuggling tunnels into Egypt, control of the Philadelphi Corridor and the grinding up of the Hamas battalions in Rafah is “satisfactory”. What more could the IDF be seeking to achieve?
The significance of Rafah for delivering humanitarian aid has waned as Gazans largely heeded requests to evacuate to al-Mawasi and Khan Younis, and the “imminent famine” has been averted by COGAT implementing steps to scale up the amount of humanitarian aid and reduce the time it takes for aid to cross into Gaza. They have done this with the help of our American allies, who have taken the lessons from Afghanistan to heart. Not to mention also satisfying the Arab monarchies interested in preserving calm and stability by providing aid. That most Gazans left Rafah suggests Hamas’ power and control over them has been significantly weakened.
The discovery and destruction of significant smuggling tunnels, whose construction and maintenance required the tacit consent of at least a plurality of the Egyptian security apparatus has legitimized (temporary) IDF control, and will deprive Hamas of a crucial means to resupply. The death of Raisi, and the power struggle that will follow makes funding for Hamas less certain.
The tunnels, the waning importance of Rafah, combined with a hamfisted attempt at duplicitous mediation have greatly reduced Egyptian leverage, and undermined Egyptian credibility. This comes at a precarious time for Egypt as it’s being bludgeoned by high inflation, diluted food imports (Ukrainian needs straining this resource), and an acute harassment of shipping lanes in the Red Sea by the Houthis. As Churchill put it, “Americans always do the right thing, after they’ve tried everything else”, and the Americans are finally realizing that if they can use leverage against Israel, they can exercise the same leverage against Egypt and Qatar.
The horrifying footage of the girls kidnapped from the observation post at Nahal Oz has reinvigorated the push toward a hostage deal, with the war cabinet granting negotiators new guidelines to restart talks. With the threat of a flood of refugees into the Sinai diminished, leverage over humanitarian aid taken off the table by the IDF operation in Rafah, and a need to save face, Egypt will play ball. And while criticism of Qatar is warranted, the fact that it is regularly hosting senior level Israeli officials means that it is now part of a regional security architecture which has bipartisan support in both houses of Congress, and majority support of the American public. The circle of peace has expanded. Those who lauded the Emirates will have to swallow their bitterness and engage with Qatar. Israeli military and logistical successes inside the Gaza Strip have forced an American recalibration of their expectations for not only “the day after” in Gaza, but also “the day after” in the Middle East.
If a hostage-for-terrorists ceasefire deal is in place, the IDF, in possession of Philadelphi Corridor, the established Netzarim Corridor, with designated safe zones in al-Mawasi and Khan Younis, and with the JLOTS pier in central Gaza, can re-establish key infrastructure like hospitals, and schools in areas free of Hamas. Iran, once again vulnerable to internal power struggles and the threat of a popular uprising against the regime will not have the resources to sustain the pace of operations of its proxies. We are on a path to a denouement of the Gaza war.
The reprieve will permit the IDF to reorganize itself to complete a gradual West Bankification of the Gaza Strip. This will happen while the world attempts to establish “a reformed PA” or some other alternative administrative arrangement, perhaps along the lines of the Emirates system proposed by Mordechai Kedar. With Gaza on the backburner, momentum for Israel-Saudi normalization will accelerate. Israel must carefully weigh whether or not such a deal is in line with its long-term strategic interests, and there are reasonable arguments to be made both for and against normalization at this juncture. Regardless, diplomatic efforts and military planning to achieve Israel’s other stated objective, to push Hezbollah beyond the banks of the Litani will gather steam. Hezbollah will withdraw, it is only a question of whether or not a military operation will be required to compel it to do so.
Lastly, right before Shabbat, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) delivered a ruling on South Africa’s request for halt to operations in Rafah. Now, setting aside the fact that the ICJ has no enforcement mechanism thereby relying on the international community, it will have little immediate practical impact. Even so, it is important to read the ruling itself, and not just the headlines about it. The Court is tasked with enforcing the Genocide Convention. South Africa requested the Court bring a halt to the Rafah offensive under the premise that it amounted to the “final step” of an Israeli campaign that violated its obligations to protect the rights of Palestinians under the Genocide Convention. Now, in addition to calling for the immediate and unconditional release of hostages (as it has done in its three previous decisions on this matter), a step that Hamas has patently refused, the Court ordered that “Israel open the Rafah crossing” - despite it being Egypt keeping it closed for humanitarian aid - that Israel allow “international investigators” into Gaza - despite thousands of personnel from humanitarian agencies being permitted to enter, despite credible reports of Hamas destroying evidence, and despite Israel having a robust and independent judiciary capable of investigating alleged violations of humanitarian law. The ruling also calls for a “halt to military and other activity” that would cause destruction of the Palestinian civilian population in whole or in part. The conditionality of this ruling provides Israel with the ability to assert before the Court that it is not engaged in any such activity, and point to the steps it has taken to protect noncombatants from harm. Notably, in a call with Secretary Blinken, Egypt announced it was reopening the Rafah crossing for humanitarian assistance, something it had strenuously avoided doing to avoid the anger of the Arab street by appearing ‘complicit’. This move was backed by Abbas to avoid that issue.
And just a couple days ago, three more hostages' bodies were recovered in Rafah, and the overall commander of the Hamas Rafah Brigade was eliminated in the tunnels beneath the city. So long as Hamas continues to hold our people hostage, and they will continue to hold them hostage because it is their only leverage to avoid total destruction, Israel has a reasonable and strong way to comply with the provisional measures, without actually halting its offensive.
With the ICJ ruling being handed down, Macron was assembling Arab foreign ministers at the Elysee, and Barnea met with Burns to discuss restarting hostage talks. An Israel in possession of the key security infrastructure in Gaza can negotiate the post-war future from a much stronger position than without it. The war will continue at least until the IDF secures the whole of the Philadelphi Corridor, destroys the major smuggling tunnels, and destroys the trained Hamas fighters stationed in Rafah. This timeline will run parallel to the hostage negotiation efforts. These negotiations are a game of telephone, and will take time. Every hostage, dead or (hopefully) alive recovered is fewer security prisoners Israel must release. The war will be concluded on the basis of mission success and the mandate provided by the War Cabinet to the hostage negotiators, not by the opinions of a Gentile court.
Signed,
Abba Eben